Recap

During the early months of 2006, Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) swiftly undid the blows dealt by the Coalition forces in late 2005. In early January, AQI formed a politico-military umbrella organization, the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC), with several other insurgent groups.^[1] This further entrenched AQI in Iraq and set the foundation for the Islamic State in Iraq in the Fall of that year (to be discussed in a forthcoming installment). At the same time, other, weaker insurgent groups realized the threat posed by AQI and began efforts to counteract and attack the organization. In response, AQI pursued a two-pronged strategy of insurgent politics. On the one hand, it massively escalated the murder and intimidation campaign against its rivals, systematically destroying any possible threat. On the other hand, it subordinated significant elements of its rivals either by cannibalizing them through mass defections or by directly integrating them into MSC’s politico-military structure. MSC’s hegemonic position over the insurgency created a “dialectic,” in which it dominated nearly every aspect of life in Anbar while causing opposition to grow in competence and severity. That is to say, the more AQI grew in power and influence, the more Anbaris wanted to fight and defeat it. Prominent Sunni tribes were split among their own sub-tribes between AQI supporters and opponents, amidst the broader resistance against the Coalition.

The new capital of this resistance was Ramadi, where AQI/MSC had shifted its main base of operations after the defeat in Al Qaim. As elsewhere in Anbar and Iraq, MSC dominated the insurgency in the city, subordinating most other insurgent groups and killing any dissidents. A strong sign of its influence in Ramadi was MSC’s power on the campus of Anbar University. Here, it drove out operatives of rivals like the 1920 Revolution Brigades, enforced sharia on campus, and had faculty spreading its message. Another sign of AQI’s influence was its enormous wealth, which it obtained primarily from the illicit oil trade, centered in the oil-producing city of Bayji in Salahuddin Province. The organization controlled two of the four major oil transportation companies, which allowed it to sell oil on the black market throughout Iraq and even in neighboring states like Syria—a troubling prognostication of the Islamic State’s later oil empire. These funds permitted MSC to invest in legitimate businesses in Ramadi and elsewhere, thus laundering its resources.

An especially perverse byproduct of AQI’s wealth was the increasing presence of essentially criminal-opportunist elements who used the organization as a means to pursue individual profit and power, with few, if any, political goals. This was another symptom of MSC’s immense power in Anbar. Previously, such opportunist elements would have run their own insurgent or outright criminal outfits. With AQI’s growing influence, such outfits would have been perceived as rivals and thus fit for destruction. To avoid this wrath, the appropriate response was to join AQI and continue criminal enterprises under its name. Such a move would have facilitated criminality as MSC’s very name elicited terror among civilians and authorities alike. As a result, MSC’s Salafi Jihadist zeal was slowly distorted, leading to the perception among Anbaris that it was both a jihadist political organization and a massive criminal syndicate.

Parallel to all of this, MSC continued to escalate the brutal ongoing sectarian war in Iraq, culminating in the February bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. This incited an especially violent episode of reprisals by Shiite militias against Sunni civilians, particularly in Baghdad, from which Sunnis were being systematically cleansed in close coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Despite the severe civilian losses, AQI’s brutal strategy was working, polarizing Sunni society in general and Sunni insurgents in particular to side with it against the Coalition and Shiites. Although ordinary Sunnis had grown weary of AQI’s abuses and violence, they perceived it as a lesser evil and the last line of defense against the vicious sectarianism of the Coalition’s Shiite allies. Yet, at the same time, a fringe but growing segment of Sunnis began to seriously resist AQI. This had begun during 2005 with the Albu Mahal in Al Qaim in western Anbar but slowly spread to the rest of the province. For example, within Ramadi, several prominent tribal leaders authorized unilateral attacks on AQI, stating that the such attacks did not breach tribal codes. These efforts were swiftly crushed, but they indicated a growing problem for AQI: discontent within its own base of Sunni Arabs. Infighting within the insurgency was the clearest manifestation of this.

Insurgent Infighting Resumes

In May 2006, concurrent with renewed tribal efforts against AQI, non-AQI insurgents once again attempted to fight AQI. Earlier that month, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi issued a statement that all those who sought military or government positions were infidels. This had two immediate consequences. First, it inspired local AQI fighters to assassinate AQI’s highest-level informant, Umar Sari al-Alwani, the secretary to Anbar provincial governor Mamoun. Although Alwani was a key AQI asset, he was also a central figure in ordinary functions at the government center. His death intimidated other employees to cease coming in for work, for fear that they would be next. The already weak Anbari provincial government was paralyzed. Second, the insurgency in Fallujah was enraged by Zarqawi’s statement. In the city itself (as opposed to its environs), the insurgency was characterized by an openness to political negotiations, a position earlier dubbed by the Coalition as the ‘Sunni Arab Resistance’ (SAR). Indeed, most SAR fighters fully intended to resume their normal careers upon an acceptable settlement. In response to Zarqawi’s provocation, they attempted to consolidate their forces into an anti-AQI front. This was stillborn, as the remaining non-AQI forces had been weakened by defections to AQI, with most potential leaders lacking any substantial forces or status:

In some cases, the groups that [REDACTED] hoped would support him had already been absorbed into or subordinated by AQI. This was the case with both the Islamic Army of Iraq and [REDACTED]’s own 1920 Revolution Brigade in Ramadi. As a result, when [REDACTED]’s 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters (who had accompanied him to Habbaniyah) managed to return to the Tamim district of Ramadi in mid-May 2006, they found themselves opposed by many of their former 1920 Revolution Brigade comrades who were now loyal to AMZ (60).

Further, AQI continued to murder and intimidate any would-be rivals, such as Hajji Raja al-Fahdawi, a key political leader in the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Zarqawi’s arrogant statement built on a number of significant factors behind anti-AQI views:

There was also the violence against relatives of SAR insurgents and Anbaris in general; the arrogance of many of the younger AQI amirs who had been promoted by the group's leadership to replace those captured or killed by the Coalition; friction with the tribes (including the Albu Fahd, Albu Issa, Albu Mahan and Zobai) over whether or not to support AQI; Iraq's sectarian tension; [REDACTED]’s claims that AQI was supported by [REDACTED]; fighting between SARs and AQI for control of the Fallujah insurgency; loss of SAR control of the Ramadi black market to AQI; efforts by the Ba'athist financiers who supported the 1920 Revolution Brigade to regain control of the insurgency; and ongoing efforts by AQI to subordinate all the local 1920 Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army of Iraq groups through threats, intimidation, and murder. Yet the SAR groups were still weak and disorganized compared to AQI and its allies, making them incapable of mounting any direct attack. Various SAR cells and groups also lacked leadership and cohesion due to a complex web of cultural, organizational, or operational factors. In the absence of a SAR leader or group of leaders who truly represented the insurgency, Coalition negotiations with or support for individual SAR leaders outside local frameworks was simply impractical (61).

The weakness of SAR insurgents ultimately lay in their questionable commitment to Iraqi national liberation. By definition, the SAR theoretically recognized the legitimacy of the Coalition and the Iraqi government. Their main concern was their own power (either as individuals or as organizations) in the post-2003 political order. The Islamic Army of Iraq was typical:

It is worth noting that the movement of the Islamic Army of Iraq (now Jaysh al-Fatihin) into the Iraqi military was quite in keeping with [REDACTED]’s original design for the organization. [REDACTED] had first created the Islamic Army of Iraq in 2004 with the goal of carrying out attacks in Ramadi in order to generate the need for a Sunni military force to protect the city. The Islamic Army of Iraq was intended to serve as that military force and would then control the capital of Anbar through his [REDACTED] (62).

The SAR’s politics were therefore opportunistic, differing little in substance from the Mahdi Army, albeit from the opposite sectarian position. This opportunism placed the SAR at a major political disadvantage to AQI, which completely rejected the Coalition, Baghdad, and everything associated with them. The openly sectarian and pro-Coalition character of the Iraqi government meant that the average Anbari viewed it as an existential enemy that had sold the country to its occupiers. In a word, the Coalition was inherently illegitimate, so the SAR’s implicit legitimization of it was a severe weak point. Further, Baghdad’s sectarian agenda gave little incentive for the average Anbari insurgent to believe that any settlement would be fulfilled–Nuri al-Maliki’s later betrayal of the Sahwa is case in point. Likewise, with the ongoing destruction of Iraqi society, the average Anbari perceived the negotiations with the Coalition as negotiations over Iraq’s carcass.^[2] The only organization that gave voice to and channeled these sentiments was AQI, which used them to build a formidable movement that credibly threatened the Coalition and later formed the Islamic State. Thus it is little surprise that so many SAR rank-and-file were sympathetic to AQI. The SAR’s failure was essentially political in nature and serves as a warning to those pursuing a similar line. This is especially clear when we contrast the SAR with Harith al-Dhari, leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars. Dhari was a prominent cleric in favor of the insurgency and opposed to the Coalition. He used his wide influence and financial contacts to fund all insurgent groups, but AQI received the largest share of aid and material support. Dhari therefore retained substantial political support but was effectively a subordinate of AQI. The failure of anti-AQI insurgents meant that more moderate militant figures like Dhari could turn only to AQI if they sought to defeat the Coalition.

During this period, the Baathists once again attempted and humorously failed to gain some form of influence in the insurgency. Their failure highlights just how delegitimized Baathism had become in 2006, which retroactively highlights its shaky foundations on the eve of Coalition invasion in 2003. The Baathists’ main asset was their significant financial resources, which they primarily directed to AQI in the hopes that this would let them regain their lost influence. This was delusional. MSC took Baathist money while holding Baathists in utter contempt. For example, all ex-regime officers, specialists, etc. recruited into AQI were vetted to ensure they understood the “tyranny and apostasy of the Baath party and opposed its evils,” per Abu Umar al-Baghdadi himself. Rivalries among Baathists both in and out of Iraq greatly hampered what little existed of the Baathist military efforts. In some cases, supposed Baathists fabricated insurgent groups, including entire chains-of-command, to convince external financiers to disburse funds. After several months of petty infighting, the Iraqi Baath reunited in June 2006, but this underscored the severe decay into which the organization had fallen: “The willingness of [REDACTED] to appoint an individual who had been associated with his primary rival only weeks earlier—and at a time when he was determined to appoint only loyalists—should help to demonstrate the level of weakness and desperation that now typified the Iraqi Ba'athist leadership.” (65) The once mighty party of Saddam Husayn had been reduced to meaningless petty rivalries and begging for scraps from Salafi Jihadists.

Master Plan for the Caliphate

In sharp contrast to rival insurgent disorganization, MSC had developed an extensive plan to conquer Iraq, form an Islamic emirate, and restore the caliphate. It is unclear how much input AQ Central had in this plan. The confusion arises from the longstanding ideological and strategic tensions between AQI and AQ Central, with the latter repeatedly admonishing the former for not obeying its orders. The confusion is worsened by the fact that AQ Central’s strategy for the Iraqi theater corresponded to AQI’s plans. This would suggest that the two were operating in lockstep, but subsequent years would greatly complicate, if not outright debunk, this impression. It is worth returning to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi from mid-2005.

In July 2005, Zawahiri sent a letter that criticized Zarqawi’s strategy and provided a revised alternative strategy of the Iraqi jihad.^[3] The date of the letter is notable, as it coincided with AQI’s embryonic emirate in western Anbar, the full extent of which was seemingly unknown to AQ Central. Zawahiri outlined four general stages:

1. Expel the US from Iraq
2. Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it until it achieves the level of a caliphate
3. Extend the jihad to secular governments neighboring Iraq
4. Declare war on Israel–this stage may coincide with Stage Three

Although there were lines of communication between AQI and AQ Central, these seemed to be quite unreliable, as Zawahiri’s letter suggests he did not know that AQI was already establishing an emirate. He mainly focused his discussion on Stages One and Two, which he emphasized must prioritize local popularity and appeal in Iraq to prepare for US withdrawal.

In general, AQ Central had long been disturbed by AQI’s brutality and disregard for popular sensibilities alongside its routine disobedience of Central Leadership. This letter was an attempt to course correct, with some successes. For popular outreach, Zawahiri specifically advised AQI to unify the various insurgent groups, to involve Iraqis in governance, and to include Iraqi jihadists in a Shura council. This advice almost certainly contributed to the formation of the Mujahidin Shura Council, which distinctly ‘Iraqified’ AQI and brought it closer to creating a formal emirate. MSC also made some cosmetic changes requested by Zawahiri—it no longer released beheading videos (but it still filmed them).^[4] AQ Central was likely pleased with this development, but it was likely unaware of MSC’s exact plans for Iraq—particularly the caliphate stage—which were far more radical than what AQ Central had envisioned. The parent organization seemed unaware of just how independent its affiliate had become.

In a secret meeting on May 4, 2006, AQI senior leadership reviewed their plans to form an emirate in Sunni Iraq. The first step was to escalate the campaign against Coalition and Iraqi security forces in Ramadi, which would be the capital of the emirate in lieu of Baghdad. AQI’s plans for conquering Baghdad were the subject of an earlier meeting. In general, Zarqawi specified that no prior authorization was needed for attacks on the Coalition and Iraq Army. The priority was to kill as many as possible. Likewise, to dissuade recruitment, Iraqi troops and police were ideally to be abducted and beheaded. Further:

The May 4 meeting included a 41-slide AQI PowerPoint presentation detailing the group's bureaucracy and infrastructure in Anbar and AMZ's [Zarqawi] plan to better organize its administrative and operational structure. As with AMZ's April 25 video, this presentation was shown in order to reinforce AMZ's control of the group. It could be argued that AMZ was dramatically accelerating his plan to assume direct control of the Sunni Triangle as a result of a groundswell of confidence in AQI's strength as a result of their success in Ramadi, an ever-increasing financial surplus from black market operations, and AQI's successful infiltration of low and mid-level Iraqi bureaucracy throughout Anbar. AMZ believed that the Coalition would withdraw from Iraq as soon as a national unity government was formed, enabling him to overwhelm the Iraqi police and army in Anbar in short order, seize control of Ramadi, and proceed from there to establish his caliphate. […]

[REDACTED (likely Abu Hamza al-Muhajir - R. Ashlar)] claimed that AQI had already established an army of fighters that would transform their campaign of individual suicide bombings into organized and collective attacks. AQI would use the same well-coordinated intelligence efforts as their Coalition enemies to improve infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in preparation for the coming Coalition withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting, [REDACTED] relayed general instructions from AMZ to his subordinates to mobilize support for AQI's post-withdrawal plans to their subordinates (67).

The preoccupation with US withdrawal partially reflects influence from Zawahiri’s letter, but it mainly reflects AQI’s confidence in its eventual absolute victory. Note that the Coalition mistakenly believed that Zarqawi was the intended caliph. This would have been impossible, as Zarqawi did not meet the necessary qualifications, particularly Qurayshite ancestry. The caliph likely would have been Abu Ali al-Anbari who headed MSC under the alias Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi.^[5] The ‘Baghdadi’ epithet already indicated something of his intended status, as Baghdad was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, which is widely considered to have presided over the Islamic Golden Age. His nomination as the caliph was prevented by his arrest and detention in the summer of 2006. The next contender was Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, whom we have already met. He was a top AQI leader, founder of an MSC constituent group (​​Jaysh al-Taifa al-Mansurah), and emir of Diyala province.

In addition to the Coalition’s own intelligence on MSC’s plan, Iraqi security forces had obtained key insights into the organization:

They believed that AQI had united several insurgent groups under its banner in preparation for an "Islamic revolution" that would make Ramadi, Samarra, and Baghdad part of a planned caliphate. According to Iraqi intelligence, AQI sought to evolve to more conventional warfare, but lacked the necessary operational momentum or tactical capability to do so. Their current stage of development required the full and direct support of the local population, uncontested safe havens, and a sufficient military force to challenge government forces in select small-scale engagements. While AQI was able to hide, train, and store weapons in the area around Lake Thar Thar, the terrain did not afford the group the ability to hide a sizable force from aerial observation by the Coalition. The Coalition also maintained an overwhelming advantage in firepower, rendering AQI unable to defeat or even stop platoon-sized Coalition forces (67-68).

In other words, the Coalition was central to suppressing AQI as an insurgent force and thwarting its politico-military ambition. This did not mean that the Coalition could defeat AQI, but it could exert a suppressive force on it. This made AQI’s (then ISI’s) strategy of imposing high human costs on the Coalition all the more important. As troop body counts grew, especially after 2005, political opinion in the US increasingly turned against the war. This contributed to the election of Barack Obama on an anti-war platform, specifically of “bringing the troops home” from Iraq—that is, ending the Coalition’s full presence on the ground. Thus, in the absence of Coalition forces, as in the post-2011 period, the Islamic State movement could regroup, advance, escalate, and transition into the quasi-state military power it aimed to be. Its anti-Coalition strategy worked, but on a longer timeline than it had initially intended. Returning to 2006, the tendency of AQI rank-and-file towards criminality increasingly concerned top leadership:

Iraqi Intelligence believed as well that AMZ and the rest of the AQI leadership saw that the group was at a strategic crossroads and feared that their organization was beginning to shift internally from a Salafist terrorist group to a criminal organization. Their fear was that while this would still enable them to retain their necessary operational tempo and outlast the Coalition, it would not allow them to defeat either the Shi'a or resurgent Ba'athists following the Coalition withdrawal (68).

In a sense, AQI was suffering from its own success as the largest, most powerful insurgent group. As already discussed, this would naturally attract opportunistic elements, who sought to use the group’s influence and resources for their own parochial ends. Zarqawi believed that AQI’s black market influence and its fearsome power were sufficient to overcome these challenges and attain victory, but his peers were skeptical.

Several top AQI leaders held a secret meeting to regain popular support, the loss of which they (correctly) blamed for several major setbacks. These leaders came up with a fascinating plan:

The meeting resulted in a new direction for AQI: to convince tribes to join AQI and cease supporting the Coalition. The plan was to negotiate with tribal sheikhs to have 5-10 trusted and well-connected members of each tribe join the organization's fearsome internal security network. The goal of these tribesmen would be to learn which tribesmen cooperated with the Coalition or the Iraqi government and to provide AQI with intelligence on Coalition military operations. The AQI leaders who attended the Amariyah meeting believed that their group’s objective should be to strengthen its control of the Euphrates River valley in order to establish Sunni-controlled safe havens from al-Qaim to Ramadi (68).

AQI’s tribal engagement efforts foreshadowed its anti-Sahwa strategy, as stated in the ‘Fallujah Memorandum’ of 2009, which prioritized both the annihilation of pro-Coalition elements and the persuasion of fence-sitters in the tribes, thus integrating tribal authority with the Islamic State’s political project.^[6] The key difference is that AQI’s strategy was more ‘hands-on’ and prioritized the Coalition, rather than popular appeal. Trusted tribesmen were to join AQI for primarily military purposes of spying on pro-Coalition tribesmen. In turn, this legitimized AQI to the tribes in general. The leaders also formed a new method for attracting new recruits:

By May 2006, [REDACTED] and his supporters had convinced AQI recruiters in Anbar to seek out disaffected youth in poor urban areas and outlying communities, looking for young men playing soccer or loitering in public areas. The recruiter would then invite the young men to his house or a mosque, offering them cell phones or money. From then on, the recruiter would begin indoctrinating the youth, encouraging them with money, favors for their families, and other benefits in return for joining AQI. Once the recruits had agreed to join and been indoctrinated, they were assigned to plant IEDs, act as couriers, and other low-ranking jobs. If they survived, they were given additional duties and in this manner worked their way up the chain of command. Other more specialized AQI recruiters operated at mosques and schools, serving as teachers, professors, and imams. These more specialized recruiters sought to sign up disaffected Iraqi police who were frustrated over their lack of regular pay (68).

That is to say, AQI primarily recruited those from a plebeian background, skewing younger, which is verified by the Coalition’s data on the average insurgent profile (77-78). Roughly 60% of detained insurgents reported that they held labor occupations (e.g., electrician, farmer, etc.), and the most common age cohort among detainees was twenty one years old. Three-fourths had no more than a high school education, with roughly half having no more than an elementary school education. Interestingly, almost 20% had some tertiary education, which corresponds to accounts of insurgent rivalries on campus.

AQI leaders’ efforts to court popular appeal began to bear some fruit in Ramadi by late May, when the group left the city to evade Coalition operations. The group forged new relations with regional tribes and shifted from simply absorbing other insurgent groups to logistically and militarily supporting them. Once the Coalition expanded its presence in Ramadi, these efforts permitted AQI to maintain its attack tempo while fleeing the city to safer strongholds. Friendly local tribes sheltered AQI middle and senior leadership, while AQI stay-behind networks acted as key advisors to local insurgent groups. As a byproduct, these networks in Ramadi transitioned into a cell structure, in which individual cells could act independently of others and without much higher oversight. The Islamic State movement continues to use this structure.

Another byproduct of AQI’s departure from Ramadi was the return of anti-AQI insurgents like the 1920 Revolution Brigades, which could finally operate without fear of repression. This emboldened anti-AQI tribes within the city to form militias to prevent AQI’s return. These tribes were further emboldened by the rumored commencement of a major Coalition operation in Ramadi. This led AQI’s remaining leadership to flee the city entirely to strongholds in the west. The decision to depart was informed by the experience in Fallujah and Al Qaim, where AQI learned that it could not win against concerted Coalition efforts to dislodge them from a city. The group assessed that it was strategically better to voluntarily depart and return at a later date. This preserved popular appeal, as the group did not force the population to endure enormous destruction as it had in Fallujah and to a lesser extent in Al Qaim.

AQI’s presence elsewhere in Anbar continued to rely on fear and intimidation, leading to continued resistance. For example, in Fallujah, local imams supported the formation of an anti-AQI militia that was primarily recruited from the police and local tribes. Non-AQI insurgents in the city, including typical AQI allies like Ansar al-Sunnah, were very irritated by the Fallujah AQI’s ultra-radical views. AQI’s hold over Haditha and Barwanah was much stronger than in Fallujah, as were its ties to the local Ansar al-Sunnah. However, this won it no popularity with the local people. AQI operatives that had arrived from Ramadi bolstered the local intimidation campaign, which killed twenty residents in the first two weeks of May. Indeed, residents felt that the Coalition had simply abandoned Haditha to AQI. The impression was well-founded:

Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by [REDACTED] now had a monopoly on petroleum products in Barwanah, with [REDACTED] using gas station money to fund the group's activities. Ansar al-Sunna also controlled all of the kerosene shipments into Barwanah, forcing residents to buy it from the group rather than on the black market. Much the same situation existed for AQI in Haqlaniyah, where former mid-level Islamic Army of Iraq commander [REDACTED] was responsible for transporting weapons, distributing propaganda, recruiting, and conducting attacks (72).

The situation in Rutbah was similar. There, AQI and allied insurgents policed the Waleed and Trebil border crossings by extorting drivers of $200 payments on threat of theft and vehicle destruction. MSC’s continued transgressions against the civilian population, especially on tribal black markets, were wearing thin on popular patience. The independent anti-MSC efforts were slowly but surely coalescing into a broader movement, but this would take several more months to pose a serious threat.

Consequences of Zarqawi’s Death

By June 2006, MSC was the most powerful insurgent group in Anbar, and fast becoming the most powerful political organization among Sunnis in general. Its bureaucratized structure and ample finances meant that the June 7 assassination of Zarqawi had minimal effect on the organization. Indeed, his death was likely a positive development for the group, as his charismatic leadership style was increasingly presenting problems both in Iraq and in the global Al Qaida network. The formation of MSC was intended to solve this threat, but Zarqawi’s prestige continued to grow, in no small part due to his increasing video appearances. Zarqawi’s assassination put an end to this, but it inadvertently empowered lower-ranking Iraqi commanders to “step up.” Indeed, at a leadership meeting, one AQI leader ominously declared that “now we are all Zarqawi.” Likewise, “AQI fighters and recruiters began driving through the Albu ‘Ubayd tribal areas, declaring to residents that Zarqawi's death had created ‘an army of Zarqawis’”—one which today spans the entire planet (80).^[7]

In AQI’s informal capital of Ramadi, the leadership was less confident and continued its exodus from the city, leaving behind skeleton networks of lower-ranking field commanders and fighters. Ironically, key AQI leaders were arrested outside Ramadi. Further, the stay-behind networks failed to enlist non-AQI insurgents to defend against a Coalition operation in the city. Both of these factors contributed to the return of leadership to Ramadi and general regrouping.

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri) replaced Zarqawi as top military commander of AQI and of MSC. Born in Egypt, Muhajir was a veteran jihadist, having fought since 1982, when he joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaida’s future second-in-command. In 1999, he traveled to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where he joined Al Qaida and received explosives training at AQ camps and gave lectures to other AQ recruits. After the Taliban’s defeat, Muhajir (alongside other key jihadists) trafficked through Iran into Iraq, initially entering Kurdistan before settling in Baghdad. He soon began setting the foundations for Zarqawi’s network. Somewhat humorously, this involved running a Pepsi kiosk in Baghdad in 2002-03 to earn some consistent revenues for jihadist purposes.^[8] In this period, Muhajir and several other key network members went to Rawah to join the eponymous Rawah Camp, an early nucleus of Islamic State. The group continued to build its network.

After the fall of the Baathist government, Muhajir alongside Zarqawi and ten other jihadists co-founded Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, the first iteration of the Islamic State movement.^[9] At the Rawah Camp, Muhajir trained alongside new fighters, mainly recruited by fellow co-founder Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani. Interestingly, one of these recruits was Manaf al-Rawi, who joined in 2003, working initially as Lubnani’s driver. Despite his inexperience in militancy, Rawi quickly became a top commander, earning Zarqawi’s trust to enter his inner circle.^[10] It is therefore all the more shocking that Rawi later betrayed Muhajir and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi in 2010, when he supplied crucial information for the raid that would end up killing both of them.^[11]

By 2004, Muhajir had become the emir of southern Anbar, and with his explosives knowledge, was a key expert in VBIED construction. He was based primarily south of Baghdad, where he planned and orchestrated SVBIED attacks on the city, in addition to regular insurgent operations. In this area, Muhajir was also intimately involved in the abduction, torture, and execution of several foreign hostages and US soldiers. His squad abducted two US troops in Yusufiyah, Thomas Tucker and Kristian Menchaca, whom Muhajir personally tortured to death and whose mutilated bodies he had filmed and released to the public. These grisly killings were done in revenge for the even grislier Mahmudiyah gang-rape and mass murders of March 2006 (which the Study curiously does not mention).^[12]

These added to Muhajir’s pristine battlefield credentials, which alongside his close, long-standing relationship to AQ Central, boded well for improved ties between the two organizations. Further, Muhajir prepared a list of 150-200 operatives (supposed traitors and dissidents) to be purged. This solidified his hold over the organization, which was especially key as a number of Iraqi AQI leaders were quite displeased by Muhajir’s ascent to leadership.

Zarqawi’s death also inspired Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to announce a vague reconciliation plan directed at Sunni Arabs in general and non-MSC Sunni insurgents in particular:

Maliki provided little detail on contentious issues such as the extent of the amnesty offered to insurgents, de-Ba'athification reform, Coalition withdrawal, and militia integration. Instead, he offered a vaguely worded amnesty "for detainees not involved in terrorist acts, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," a quick release of prisoners not charged with crimes, greater domestic and international oversight of Iraqi prisons, and compensation for Iraqis who had been harmed by terrorism, military operations, and sectarian violence (82).

Eleven Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR) insurgent groups engaged Maliki’s National Reconciliation Plan and stated the following conditions on any integration:

1. A timetable for Coalition withdrawal.

2. An end to Coalition and Iraqi military operations against SAR insurgent groups.

3. Compensation for Iraqis killed in Coalition military operations and reimbursement for property damage.

4. An end to the ban on army officers from Saddam Hussein’s government in the new Iraqi military.

5. An end to the government ban on former Ba’athists.

6. The release of SAR insurgent group members currently being held in detention.

7. Recognition of SAR insurgent groups as legitimate political organizations (82).

Although these demands corresponded to Maliki’s plan in spirit, the latter’s strident opposition to “Baathism” and Sunni political power in general presented roadblocks, as did Shia political forces’ suspicion, if not hostility, to the insurgents. Strikingly, the Study notes: “Many Shi'a did not view the actions of the SAR groups as comparable to their own under Saddam Hussein.” (82) Maliki therefore had strong incentives against meaningful engagement with the SAR insurgency. Further, this reconciliation plan had no serious response to MSC, whose dominance of the insurgency raised grave concerns. Maliki endorsed a military solution to MSC, even though MSC represented an essentially political problem: Sunnis’ rejection of the post-2003 order. MSC was an ultra-extreme form of a broader Sunni political position—one which greatly complicated even SAR insurgents’ engagement in the reconciliation process. Indeed:

…rapprochement with the Coalition ran counter to the ingrained notions of resistance to occupation, restoration of Sunni dominance in Iraq, restoration of the Sunni to positions of privilege, and shielding the Iraqi Sunnis from Shi’a reprisals that motivated the majority of rank-and-file SAR fighters. To these low-level fighters, the Coalition was an implacable foe with whom no negotiation was possible under any circumstances (83).

The only organization which gave voice to this position and put it into practice was MSC, bolstering its political prestige in the insurgency, despite its immense brutality. Maliki’s continued refusal to crackdown on the Shia militias and their takeover of key Iraqi security forces also played into ordinary insurgents’ worst fears, thus vindicating MSC’s propaganda. For many common Sunnis, the escalating sectarian violence and general deterioration of the Iraqi state’s capabilities rendered MSC into a lesser evil, albeit an extremely resented one.

In parallel to the SAR’s failed engagement, a number of Sunni and Anbari political outfits emerged in response to Maliki’s reconciliation proposal. One was the Anbar Central Council, formed in July, which unsuccessfully sought to unite the assorted Sunni and SAR leaders. Its goals differed little from that of the SAR’s writ large, but the inability of its members to form a unified political framework and network made its efforts obsolete. The Council was stillborn. Similarly, one Sunni leader, Salih Mutlaq, attempted to form a government-in-exile in Amman in hopes of a military coup in Baghdad. Mutlaq was a delusional blowhard whose supporters numbered in the dozens at most. The Coalition monitored him but did not consider him a credible threat. A similarly unserious character was Anbari Shaykh Mudhir Abdul-Karim al-Kharbit, who attempted to unite all Anbari tribes into a single political bloc to oppose the Coalition. This task was impossible, as many tribes were fighting each other on this very issue, with a majority aligned to the insurgency, particularly MSC, and a growing minority aligned to the Coalition. In this same period, the Baathists once again attempted and failed to gain any influence in the insurgency.

A much more serious initiative came from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which sought to form a specific militia to defend Sunnis from Shia militias. This effort was led by Planning Minister Ali Baban, who had grown deeply concerned by the scale of sectarian violence against Sunnis:

The reason for Ali Baban's concern was that the Facilities Protection Service, which numbered 135-150,000 armed men, was being brought under the control of the Shi'a interior ministry, leaving many Sunni leaders concerned over who would protect their public infrastructure and buildings. Baban's effort to set up an IIP militia followed months of warnings from IIP, Tawafuq Front, and INDF that the Sunnis would set up their own militia if the Iraqi government failed to stop the Shi'a militias and balance out the predominantly Shi'a interior ministry (86).

The greatest threat to this came not from Baghdad but MSC, which had long hated the IIP, as it perceived it to be an “apostate” group that misled Sunnis and supposedly legitimized the Coalition. MSC (and AQI before it) therefore ruthlessly targeted the organization, beginning in 2004 and escalating in 2006. As with everything else in Anbar, tribal dynamics were at play:

From August 22 onwards, the IIP fight against AQI was supported by elements of the Albu Mahal tribe. The Albu Mahal blamed the Anah AQI for vehicle theft that prevented al-Qaim from receiving fuel and other goods and were unwilling to give the group a foothold for control over lucrative smuggling routes (87).

Recall that the Albu Mahal first rose up in Al Qaim against AQI due to the latter’s takeover of key smuggling routes, which remained the object of competition and conflict. Similarly, Jaysh al-Fatihin (formed from the remnants of the Islamic Army of Iraq) was supported by the Albu Fahd tribe in opposing AQI in the Sufia district of Ramadi. The Anbar Revolutionaries had also reformed in the June-July period and began attacking AQI, killing dozens of its fighters and inspiring local leaders to defy AQI. For example, a Ramadi imam hired snipers to kill AQI commanders and sent circulars to AQI members’ homes, ordering their immediate departure from the city on threat of death. Individually, none of these efforts could ever defeat or even significantly challenge MSC, but together, they reflected the growing resistance in Anbari society to MSC, which would ultimately culminate in the Sahwa movement.

Iraqi Police’s Continued Woes

Throughout the summer of 2006, the Iraqi police’s effectiveness across Anbar continued to decline due to AQI’s murder and intimidation campaign. This was a product of the larger inability to create an effective national police force. The problem was the worst in Ramadi and Fallujah, the two biggest cities in Anbar. Despite the AQI leadership’s dispersal from Ramadi, it was still able to coordinate with stay-behind networks to continue the campaign against Ramadi police. The vast majority of police simply refused to patrol their routes, owing to not only the intimidation but also widespread lack of combat experience. Indeed, most police simply fled upon coming under attack. The state of Fallujah police was somehow worse, highlighting problems throughout the police chain-of-command in Anbar.

In late June, the Anbar general police chief Sha’ban Muhammad Samir came under investigation for corruption, particularly the pilfering of $6,000,000 funding intended for Fallujah police:

In actuality, Sha'ban was a former Ba'athist who had refused to kickback 10% of the Iraqi police payroll to a corrupt official in the interior ministry. His discontent with the interior ministry from this incident led him to steal millions of dollars from the interior ministry and the police. More ominously, he aided AQI efforts against the Coalition while taking money for himself. His personal security detail now included AQI members who took part in a variety of violent activities including assassinations. [REDACTED], a member of Sha’ban’s bodyguard, was an AQI cell leader in Fallujah associated with [REDACTED]. Communicating with AQI in Ramadi through Hirzallah, Sha'ban let the group know when his police would depart for their patrols (91).

Note the Ministry of Interior’s corrosive role. Its highly compromised nature nullified the efforts of even sincere employees of the Ministry or those government bodies related to it. In mid-July, the Ministry arrested Sha’ban. His replacement resigned shortly after being appointed due to his fear of being arrested. Another police chief was appointed, but this one was an AQI agent who provided police pay rosters and other details on specific officers to assassinate. In parallel, AQI’s “anti-Iraqi police force had reportedly swelled to as many as five hundred members of varying levels of commitment who prevented the Albu Sha'ban, Albu Muhjabil, and Albu Dhiab tribe from joining the Iraqi police or enlisting in the Iraqi army.” (92) This presaged a drastic escalation by AQI against the Fallujah police

The arrest of Sha’ban led AQI to declare war on the Fallujah police. AQI first assassinated two senior police officers in Fallujah. The assassination of the senior police enraged the broader department, as these were the first dead since 2004. This was worsened by AQI’s murder of three highway patrol officers—all beheaded—which marked the first AQI attack on highway patrol, which had previously been left alone since it was highly infiltrated and sympathetic to AQI. In response, the police arrested twenty-six key AQI members. Shaykh Nazar, the AQI commander leading the anti-police effort, issued a threat to the Fallujah police chief: either stop combatting AQI or face total war. Quite bravely, the chief chose war, leading to fifty-nine AQI attacks on police from June 29 to August 1 (of 2006), almost triple the figure from the same period of 2005. AQI’s campaign was successful:

Many Fallujah police became disillusioned over the summer by constant AQI attacks and internal corruption, resulting in some police quitting their jobs. Sheikh Nazar's near-incessant attacks, a lack of support from the Fallujah judiciary, and corruption in both the police and the judiciary were the most common explanations given for their departure. The increase in attacks on the Fallujah police was due to the fact that all of the disparate AQI factions in the city coordinated their murder and intimidation efforts against the police under the leadership of Sheikh Nazar (93).

The situation elsewhere in Anbar was similarly severe. Where the police were not under consistent and extreme attack, they were thoroughly compromised by MSC—or both, as in Zangora. Here, the local MSC commander focused entirely on killing police and destroying the police force of the town. He set up checkpoints to stop and kill police, paying $500 per officer killed. This culminated in a July 3 attack on police departments in three nearby settlements. The officers were given the choice of resigning, joining MSC, or execution. MSC ensured that those who resigned were replaced by their own insurgents. Despite sustained Coalition efforts, MSC’s power continued to rapidly grow to the point that the US military privately assessed that it could no longer militarily defeat AQI.

On August 17, Marine Colonel and Intelligence Officer Peter Devlin wrote a report on the extremely dire situation in Anbar.^[13] It is worth quoting at length:

General Situation: As of mid-August 2006, the daily average number of attacks exceeds 50 per day in al-Anbar Province. This activity reflects a 57% increase in overall attack numbers since I MEF assumed control of the province in February. Intensifying violence is reflected in the preponderantly negative outlook of the Sunni population, in the continuing inability to develop adequate Iraqi security forces, and in the near complete failure of reconstruction and development projects across western Iraq. The social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that MNF [Multi-National Forces] and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar. [Emphasis original]

Social Collapse: Underlying this decline in stability is the near complete collapse of social order in al-Anbar. The tribal system has wholly failed in AO Raleigh and Topeka, and has only limited efficacy in AO Denver. Prominent leaders have exiled themselves to neighboring Jordan and Syria, including some leading imams. Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial level have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) or criminal/insurgent gangs. Violence and criminality are now the principal driving factors behind daily life for most Anbar Sunni; they commit violence or crime, avoid violence or crime through corruption and acquiescence, or become victims.

Isolation from Baghdad: Already embroiled in a daily fight for survival, al-Anbar Sunni have little hope for national reconciliation or re-integration into the national polity. From the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized. True or not, this paranoia directly undermines Sunni willingness to envision a unified Iraq under the current structure. These fears also are reinforced by actions of the Shi'a-dominated government, including the failure to pay ISF in al-Anbar, attacks by official Shi'a paramilitary groups against Sunni civilian targets in Baghdad, the unwillingness to confront the Jaysh al-Mahdi [Mahdi Army], bureaucratic attacks on popular Sunni political and military leaders, and minimal support for local government institutions and initiatives from Ramadi to al-Qa'im. This sense of isolation directly undermines Sunni willingness to work within IG [Iraqi Government] and MNF defined social and political boundaries.

His analysis of AQI is particularly grim:

Al-Qaida in Iraq: AQI is the dominant organization of influence in al-Anbar, surpassing nationalist insurgents, the Iraqi Government, and MNF in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni. Transitioning to a primarily Iraqi organization in late 2004, AQI has become an integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq.^[14] With this "Iraqification" came devolution to low-level, semi-autonomous, and criminally financed cells of varying loyalty to the larger AQI organization. While this diffusion has weakened the original Salafi zeal of AQI writ large, it has eliminated the opportunity for a decapitating strike that would cripple the organization - this is why the death of Zarqawi had so little impact on the structure and capabilities of AQI, especially in al-Anbar.

AQI effectively has eliminated, subsumed, marginalized or co-opted all nationalist insurgent groups in al-Anbar. This very deliberate AQI campaign against rival insurgent groups began shortly after national elections in December 2005, when nationalist insurgent groups cooperated to prevent AQI from disrupting polling throughout al-Anbar. Faced with this blatant challenge to their hegemony, AQI destroyed the Anbar People's Council of Mohammed Mahmoud Latif through a highly efficient and comprehensive assassination campaign, thereby eliminating the sole rival nexus of insurgent leadership in al-Anbar. Following this calculated purge, AQI cunningly employed their greater financial resources, superior organization, proven leadership, and brutal tactics to consolidate their hold on most other nationalist insurgent cells in al-Anbar. Parallel to this effort, AQI enacted a tactical alliance with the small Ansar al-Sunna cells operating in some parts of al-Anbar, particularly in the Haditha Triad.

Al-Anbar Sunni now see an entrenched, Iraqi AQI that in some cases has taken on the mantle of nationalism, or more recently, "defender of the faithful" against the Iranian-backed Shi'a. Although most al-Anbar Sunni dislike, resent, and distrust AQI, many increasingly see it as an inevitable part of daily life and, in some cases, their only hope for protection against a possible ethnic cleansing campaign by the central government.

The remaining core of AQI Salafists retain the capability to guide the organization in broad terms; they can shift resources, fund specific groups, and mass combat power for short "campaigns" by pulling in disparate cells from across western Iraq. The zeal of the vanguard remains relatively intact - there can be no realistic expectation that AQI will negotiate with the IG or MNF short of accepting absolute surrender and ascension to power. The perceived indecisiveness and moral weakness of both the IG and MNF directly feed the resolve of AQI, as well as the grudging acceptance of AQI by the populace. As long as the status quo between the central government and the al-Anbar Sunni remains, AQI is an intractable problem.

AQI’s Power Across Anbar

Devlin’s report is illustrated by AQI’s power across settlements in Anbar. The situation in Ramadi grew even darker than before the anti-police campaign. As expected, the dispersal of AQI leadership did not impede on its operational capabilities in the city, as these were fulfilled by AQI-aligned members of Islamic Army of Iraq and other allies. One notable distinction was that these members refrained from attacks against civilians. In any case, AQI’s control over the city was now unquestioned, and its hold over the education system was particularly disturbing:

Perhaps most importantly, AQI began to re-educate Anbaris by using schools in Ramadi to indoctrinate Iraqi children with Salafist beliefs. Middle-class Salafis loyal to AQI taught several classes per day and falsified their employment records to extort money from the education ministry. While young children were already used by AQI as spotters or IED emplacers, the group had a more long-term vision of its war against the United States and sought to flood the curricula at all levels with classes designed to instill extremist values. Other classes, such as those held at the Ar-Rabat Elementary School instructed children how to build IEDs or suicide bomber vests. While groups such as Harakat Islamiyah and Islamic Army of Iraq also recruited children, they did so primarily by distributing toys and telling children that they should love, respect, and admire the insurgents for fighting the United States. AQI, on the other hand, was indoctrinating children for its continuing war with the United States (94).

This built on AQI’s efforts to control Anbar University in Ramadi. Islamic State would continue and radicalize this practice during its territorial “caliphate” and beyond. One highly unsettling radicalization was the inclusion of children as executioners in IS snuff films.

MSC’s significant power could also be observed in the Haditha Triad, nearby settlements, and associated corridors. In Hit, the Coalition simply stopped receiving intelligence reports on the city beginning in the summer due to the insurgency’s extreme sway over the city and beyond. For example, AQI exerted its influence by destroying the Kubaysah police station and preventing any police recruitment. As a result, there was only one police department (that of Baghdadi village) operating in the entire Hit-Haditha corridor. In Haditha itself, MSC was so powerful that its members no longer hid their identities or even their activities. This confidence was reflected in the creation of the Haditha Shura Council, a formal coordinating body for the local MSC, Ansar al-Sunnah, and al-Asa’ab al-Iraq branches, which had all already effectively merged. Fighters and commanders in the Triad felt they were serving the Haditha Shura, rather than any one leader, thus ensuring group cohesion. Meanwhile, in Haqlaniyah, MSC’s constant attacks significantly disrupted civilian life by forcing the closure of the local market. The group also destroyed the local police station. In the last city of the Triad, Barwanah, AQI used its control of gas stations to substantially profit, boosting its ongoing efforts against the anti-AQI Albu Nimr tribe, which was attempting to restore the local police.

AQI’s hold over western Anbar was similarly strong. In Anah, MSC successfully intimidated the entire municipal leadership into ceasing relations with the Coalition and going into hiding. Likewise, in Rawah, AQI had pushed the local police into near-collapse and had fully neutralized the municipal government, which by late August simply ceded authority to the insurgents. The situation in Rutbah was especially extreme:

In Rutbah, AQI's murder and intimidation campaign took a new turn when leader [REDACTED] (detained by the Coalition on July 14 and released July 22) ordered the rape of a female member of Rutbah city leader Majid Ayish S'ud's household after threatening him on two previous occasions. While Majid had ties of his own to the SAR insurgents, since April 2006 he had been attempting to persuade insurgents in Rutbah to cease attacks and let peace prevail in the city. Following the rape, AQI informed Majid that a member of his family would be killed if the group heard any further claims that he was cooperating with the Coalition. As a result, Majid refused to associate himself with the Rutbah city council or the Coalition.

AQI spiritual leader [REDACTED] issued orders for the Fayadh and Jughayfi tribesmen to leave Rutbah on August 7 because the families of Iraqi AQI fighters were being moved from Ramadi to Rutbah and needed homes to stay in. The Karbuli tribesmen in Rutbah were also forcibly evicted from their homes by AQI fighters from Ramadi, who quickly took over the buildings and used them to house their own families. Masked AQI fighters recruited from the dominant Kubaysi tribe in the city patrolled the town market under the direction of [REDACTED]. At his order, members of the Rutbah energy department shut down all power in the city at night so that AQI members could move freely under the cover of darkness (101-102).

Note the recurring use of fuel and energy as weapons for the insurgency, a troubling mirror to the Coalition’s own blockade of Fallujah in the fall of 2004. One exception to AQI’s dominance in western Anbar was Al Qaim, where the organization remained quite weak. The Hamza Battalion had been reformed, now under Coalition auspices. Unlike 2005, AQI now attempted to negotiate with the Battalion to no avail, indicating the insurgency’s weakness. The most severe sign was AQI’s use of female suicide bombers, a highly radical act in jihadism, which the Islamic State movement would continue to practice and even radicalize by including women fighters (such as in Baghuz):

While attempts to recruit women to serve as suicide bombers did not endear AQI to residents, the group believed that the use of female suicide bombers would either enable its operatives to get through checkpoints or force the Coalition to change its security stance towards women, angering residents and creating resentment that AQI could then exploit (102).

However, Al Qaim was not the only site of opposition to AQI. MSC’s immense power and overbearing reign inspired further dissent, as seen in Fallujah during this same period. The insurgency in the city had long been uncoordinated and unstructured with weak leadership due to the competition not only between insurgent groups but among AQI’s own commanders. This weakness encouraged Fallujah’s community leadership—imams, tribal leaders, and prominent merchants—to support the Shaykh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade, an anti-AQI militia. In addition, three local tribes (the Albu Alwan, Albu Issa, and Mohamdi) supported the militia. Crucially, non-AQI insurgents, including those ideologically aligned to AQI like Ansar al-Sunnah, refused to attack the Issawi Brigade. This was motivated by their own opposition to AQI’s especially arrogant policy that anyone who cooperated with the Coalition was an apostate to be killed: “Saraya al-Jihad was particularly vehement in its anti-AQI views because AQI had killed Captain Ali, who had been one of the group’s top informants and provided it with detailed information on agreements between the Coalition and the Fallujah city council.” (96) Recall that many of AQI’s most valuable assets were Iraqi government employees who necessarily cooperated with the Coalition. The blatant hypocrisy did not escape other insurgents in Fallujah. In the Fall, they would be joined by broader tribal resistance.

Summer Balance Sheet of AQI

As already stated, the departure of AQI’s leadership from Ramadi did not impact its operational or political effectiveness in the city. It deepened its influence by sending insurgents to mosques to monitor discussions or sermons. The expression of anti-AQI views by imams or mosque-goers meant certain death. Similarly, AQI tightened its grip on Anbar University:

As discussed earlier, the previous university dean [REDACTED] had been intimidated into supporting AQI and the new acting university dean [REDACTED] maintained AQI ties, as did the deans of the law, medicine, and agricultural schools. Of the 4,000 students who attended the university, roughly 30% were active to some degree or another in the insurgency. AQI next set up an IED factory in the university, using security guards to move bombmaking materials onto the campus. Once the IEDs had been manufactured, the guards moved them off campus to have them planted by AQI members (103).

This solidified the organization’s hold over the entire Ramadi education system from young children to university students.

AQI in Fallujah was much less organized despite its significant power in absolute terms. The organization was still in need of a single leader, or emir, who could direct local commanders and fighters. Instead, there were several commanders, who were subordinate to an AQI committee composed of seven leaders,^[15] which was in turn subordinate to a larger AQI committee composed of leaders from different settlements.^[16] In parallel to these committees, there were several operational leaders directing attacks on the ground:

[REDACTED] was the operational leader of AQI in Fallujah, supervising fifty cells of ten-fifteen fighters (500-750 total fighters). He coordinated and financed large-scale attacks in Fallujah using funding and financial support from Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi al-Halbusi, who oversaw financing and facilitation of AQI fighters in Fallujah. He provided them with ID cards, money, weapons, vehicles, and combat replacements. While [REDACTED] was AQI’s operations chief in Fallujah, Sheikh Nazar Sa’di Zahir supervised his activities, coordinated strategy with the group’s leadership, and personally commanded ten cells of fighters (100-150 men) on the eastern side of the city (104).

This muddled leadership naturally weakened overall operational effectiveness and forced the local AQI to decentralize to a much greater extent than elsewhere. Unlike in other cities, rank-and-file AQI fighters were not even provisioned with their own weapons and resorted to stealing firearms from murdered police officers. However, relatively reduced effectiveness did not mean absolute ineffectiveness. AQI was still able to consistently mount attacks, many of which were quite severe like the assassination of senior police officials.

Meanwhile, MSC’s reign over the Hit-Haditha corridor continued unobstructed. MSC’s and Ansar al-Sunnah’s significant financing was a key tool in their control, acting as a “carrot” for possible recruits: “By providing money and moral support to the families of their members, the two groups were able to provide an alternative to the Coalition and the Iraqi government.” (105) In contrast, the “stick” was the insurgency’s ruthless intimidation campaign:

The other major group in the city was the Black Banners, who were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of more than sixty residents suspected of providing information to the Coalition. The group had kidnapped these people, interrogated them, and recorded their confessions on video to be distributed throughout the Haditha area (105).

In addition, the insurgency destroyed key government buildings, ordinary homes, and the telecommunications center to intimidate possible rivals from cooperating with the Coalition. The tactic succeeded but wore heavily on the population.

AQI experienced major setbacks in Anah and Amiriyah in large part due to its arrogant brutality. In Anah, a verbal argument between an AQI member and a local shaykh escalated into a fight in which the AQI member shot the shaykh, who previously had strongly supported the group. Locals accordingly turned on AQI and began taking arms. Meanwhile, in Amiriyah, AQI’s war on the police and cynical instrumentalization of tribal rivalries backfired. Troubles began in late June, when four AQI operatives attacked a police station, leading to the death of one and the capture of the other three. In response, the Albu Issa tribe issued a statement supporting the police, stating that the tribe would militarily defend them. The tribe then deployed 200 fighters, armed with mortars and RPGs, to protect the police. This was partially motivated by the Albu Issa’s anger at its own al-Owesat subtribe, which was known for its ties to AQI, especially in its anti-police efforts.

MSC and Illicit Oil

By the June-July period, MSC’s largest source of revenue was the illicit oil trade, in which it was deeply embedded. The “supply chain” began in the Bayji Oil Refinery and Distribution Center, where refined fuel was loaded onto trucks for transport. MSC formed checkpoints outside Bayji to stop and steal gasoline trucks, which were then driven to the Albu Ubayd tribal area. Here, the trucks were emptied and the gasoline was barreled for resale at Ramadi. To avoid Coalition policing actions, MSC set up fuel distribution points outside Ramadi, where young men were recruited to buy gasoline in containers at the rate of $1 per liter. The illicit fuel trade within Ramadi was extremely profitable. It is worth quoting the Study at length:

Within Ramadi, oil distribution director [REDACTED] also provided oil to AQI, appointing [REDACTED] to supervise the distribution of fuel to the group. While Turki had fled Ramadi for [REDACTED] in April 2006, by July he had returned to the city and resumed his relationship with AQI. Turki provided AQI [REDACTED] and his representatives with 20-25,000 liters of petroleum every day that were then sold by truck on the black market to gas and large generator stations throughout Ramadi at the price of 1,000 dinars ($0.68) a liter. This enabled AQI to generate $105,000 per week and $450,000 per month in revenue from Ramadi petroleum profits alone.

The same sort of situation held true for propane gas. While the legal distributors of propane gas received 35,000 liters, only 5,000 were given to the general public and the rest ended up in the hands of AQI. Director-general of oil [REDACTED] was supposed to account for oil, but he had been missing for several months and no ministry of oil personnel were willing to travel to the Government Center [due to fear of AQI - R. Ashlar].

AQI's profits from the sale of black market fuel should not be underestimated. While it is impossible to put an exact figure on the group's profits because of the lack of complete records in Anbar, as of April 2006, AQI received 600,000 liters of benzene and 300,000 liters of crude oil per month. If AQI controlled only 50% of benzene distribution, the group could generate up to $597,000 a month in revenue according to the July black market price of $1.99 a liter or $7.57 a gallon in Ramadi. In addition to benzene and crude oil, AQI also controlled the distribution of propane and diesel, giving them power over the general population by controlling their access to fuel (108).

This greatly contributed to the Iraqi Oil Minister’s announcement that fuel shortages would continue for at least another year. The Iraqi government attempted to mitigate the crisis with a number of reforms, including the deployment of Iraqi army units at oil refineries, but these were not immediately effective, especially in Anbar, where fuel shortages continued to worsen. MSC’s use of oil also shifted from pure profit-seeking to political coercion and control of the civilian population:

In some ways, AQI’s new oil policy showed the influence of [REDACTED]’s initiative. Whereas under [REDACTED], AQI had only sold oil on the black market for profit, now oil was used to influence Anbaris to back the group. Between forty to sixty masked AQI fighters were sent to the oil distribution center in Ramadi every day to obtain oil for residents who supported the group, with some supporters obtaining fuel for themselves and others receiving free fuel to sell on the black market. Because AQI rather than the Iraqi government or the provincial government now controlled who could purchase oil, this helped to build and maintain support for AQI in Ramadi. Whether residents approved of AQI's political or religious ideology or not, they were forced to at least feign support in order to receive fuel.

On the other hand, those towns, villages or individuals who did not support AQI would have their propane, gasoline or oil cut off. Residents of the city of al-Qaim, for instance, were described as “traitors” and their fuel was nearly completely cut off during the summer of 2006, leading to widespread shortages and, ironically as noted above, also preventing the insurgency from reconstituting in the area (108-109).

The accelerating decline of the Iraqi government’s capabilities—in no small part due to the brutal neoliberal shock therapy to which it was subjected—encouraged the privatization of fuel transportation. In late August, several fuel transport companies, including some headed or staffed by key AQI operatives, formed a trucking consortium which entered into a contract with the Anbari provincial government. This consortium would be responsible for the shipping of fuel and other goods. This privatization directly benefited AQI, which was now able to even more deeply embed itself in the essential economy of Anbar: “As Anbari residents became more dependent on private transportation companies like White Sails and the al-Rawi Group to deliver the fuel they needed for cooking, electricity, and transportation, AQI was able to insinuate itself further into vital sectors of Anbar's economy.” (109) As already discussed, the destruction of Iraqi productive forces directly contributed to the power and expansion of ultra-extremist groups like AQI. In a functional and prosperous Iraq, citizens would have little reason to join AQI, the state would be able to effectively combat it, and the economy would be “off-limits” to the group beyond a superficial level. In the absence of such circumstances, the only way to combat AQI’s control of the oil trade was through military means.

This took the form of Coalition operations beginning in May, which culminated in August with Operation Valdez Revenge. The Coalition and Iraqi Army began by policing smuggling and corruption at the Bayji Oil Refinery and surrounding gas stations. In particular, gas station owners were required to ensure their oil was sold to the Bayji population, not to the black market. The Coalition also mandated new security procedures, which, alongside the policing actions, reduced the level of smuggling. On August 17, the Coalition began Operation Valdez Revenge, which lasted until August 21, during which time it detained twenty fuel trucks and arrested over sixty people. This disrupted AQI’s oil “supply chain” but it did not substantially reduce their earnings on the black market. Incidentally, it is almost certain that veterans of MSC’s oil operations later oversaw the Islamic State’s massive illicit oil enterprises in Syria.^[17]

Although oil was the biggest single source of income, MSC had highly diversified revenue streams. These were concentrated in Ramadi, Haditha, and Mosul, which together accounted for 44% of all cash seizures by the Coalition. MSC’s businesses were both illicit and legitimate, ranging across small stores, workshops, river fisheries, farmland, kidnapping rings, vehicle theft, extortion, racketeering, and of course oil smuggling. Although the Coalition made concerted efforts to disrupt MSC’s financing, these made only small dents: “While the Coalition captured $1,100,000 between January and May of 2006, the insurgency spent between $20-40,000,000 during that same period” (110). Further, MSC’s integration into the ordinary Iraqi economy also extended to finances:

AQI also made extensive use of hawalas to move funds, which presented a serious problem for the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Due to security concerns about traditional banking services in Anbar, many Anbaris used local hawalas as "citizen trust funds." Residents deposited their money with hawaladors who then used the funds to cover other transactions. As a result, money seized during hawala raids might belong to an insurgent group, but legitimate citizens could also inadvertently be denied access to their trust fund deposits. Furthermore, the money in these trust funds was dispersed to numerous safe houses to lower the chances of robbery. Coalition raids on AQI associated hawalas in Husaybah indicated that the group deliberately used hawalas in areas devoid of insurgent activity in order to avoid the discovery of their safe houses by Coalition or Iraqi security forces during counter-insurgency operations (110).

Informalization is an essential aspect of neoliberalism. As with everything else, the destruction of the Iraqi economy provided ample opportunities for AQI to profit and shield itself. We would see this same process repeat again at a much larger scale during the Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ period.^[18]

Another extremely important source of MSC’s power was its ability to continually recruit fighters and commanders, in large part due to sectarian violence. The violence in Baghdad and Basra, where Sunnis were ruthlessly persecuted, forced the escape of over six thousand families to Fallujah by mid-July. The city council estimated that roughly three thousand Sunni refugees were arriving in the city per month. This compounded Fallujah’s already significant economic and political problems. These refugees were the ideal audience and recruitment pool for MSC’s message and politics. Having been victimized by Shia militias with no justice from the Iraqi government, these refugees had extremely personal reasons for joining MSC and enforcing its ultra-sectarian vision. Furthermore, “The growth of the perception that Iraq was in a state of civil war facilitated AQI recruitment as more and more internal refugees arrived with stories of persecution and atrocities by Shi'a militias” (111). In this period, AQI thus began recruiting and sending larger cohorts to Baghdad to strike Shia militias and civilians in revenge for Sunnis. This accelerated Iraq’s descent into sectarian civil war and social destruction.

MSC’s continued subordination of other insurgent groups was another key source of recruits. MSC and AQI war chief Abu Hamza al-Muhajir prioritized incorporating as many insurgent groups as possible under the MSC banner:

The main point of friction between AQI and the local groups was the continued targeting of members of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army. Yet every time the topic was raised the AQI representatives were able to make compelling arguments from the Qu'ran and the hadith that were ultimately viewed as persuasive by the other insurgent leaders (111).

Any remaining taboos on attacking Iraqi police and troops were rapidly being washed away. The police were dubbed “apostates” while troops were ridiculed as “pagan guards.” While the fate of any US troop captured by AQI was highly unenviable, the fate of captured Iraqi troops was especially dire. MSC’s successful efforts to incorporate or ally with other insurgent groups meant that the number of attacks in Ramadi increased to an average of 139 per week. The organization’s ample wealth also allowed it to buy off or hold onto potential rivals. This permitted MSC to continue influencing the former Islamic Army of Iraq and even begin swaying the anti-AQI Jaysh al-Fatihin. Although Ramadi was the most extreme instance of this strategy, it spanned all of Anbar and Sunni Iraq, as seen in the Haditha Shura Council or in Mosul. Strikingly, this strategy led to MSC co-opting staunch opponents like the 1920 Revolution Brigade, which soon cooperated with MSC on a deep level:

Also typical was the financial and weapons cooperation illustrated in a late July operation. [REDACTED], a 1920 Revolution Brigade member, facilitated the transfer of $18 million to [REDACTED] (an arms facilitator for the 1920 Revolution Brigade) so that [REDACTED] could purchase various weapons, including SAM-7 rockets, Russian sniper rifles, RPGs, PKCs, TNT, 62mm mortars, and 82mm mortars. Once the weaponry was delivered, representatives of [REDACTED], the 1920 Revolution Brigade members, and AQI leader [REDACTED] intended to begin distributing the weapons. $15,000,000 of the $18,000,000 used to cover the purchase had been provided to 1920 Revolution Brigade by former Iraqi Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General Khaldun Khattab ibn al-Tikriti. To place this purchase in context, it should be remembered that the weapons budget for the entire Iraqi interior ministry for 2006 was roughly $250,000,000 (112).

Aside from financial means, another key strategy of co-opting non-AQI insurgents was by forming umbrella or associate groups. This had early precedents, as in early 2004, when Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad formed the Secret Islamic Army—headed by future IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani—as an umbrella group to cooperate with the 3,000 strong militia named Salafi Jihad. This militia was soon incorporated into JTJ. In 2006, AQI formed a number of groups to incorporate its supporters who originally belonged to separate groups. Some were entirely new like Sadr Sunnah in Ramadi, composed of pro-AQI Islamic Army of Iraq members, or reconstituted like al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal in Hit, composed of pro-AQI insurgent groups in western Anbar that had been dispersed or suppressed by Operation Sayyad II. In response to MSC’s continued expansion, especially in Ramadi and Haditha, the Coalition commenced several operations which killed several leaders and hundreds of fighters. However, these had only temporary effects, which were quickly undone by replacements.

International Ties to AQI

An understated but growing dynamic was AQI’s expanding ties to the Syrian state, the arrogant stupidity of which is almost comedic in hindsight. Although the Assad regime was deeply suspicious of Islamists, having fiercely suppressed them in 1982, it instrumentally supported AQI to bog down the Coalition. In cooperation with Iran, the Syrian state intended to turn Iraq into a “new Vietnam” for the US.^[19]

It is no coincidence that foreign jihadists’ primary route of entry into Iraq was through Syria. The regime was fully aware of this traffic, but turned a blind eye—indeed they facilitated it—as it saw it as a useful weapon against the US.^[20] It was also aware that AQI used eastern Syria, particularly Dayr al-Zawr, as a strategic rearguard. For example, Abu Dua al-Badri (aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) self-exiled to Syria from 2006-10, during which time he was a full-time AQI then ISI operative—Badri would return again to Syria in 2013, this time as a conqueror. However, Syria’s role in AQI’s activities went much further than trafficking.

The Assad regime was intimately involved in AQI’s planning of specific operations, especially suicide attacks. Naturally, this meant that the two regularly met with one another:^[21]

[REDACTED] held regular meetings with [Syrian Military Intelligence] chief Asif Shawkat, the brother-in-law of [Syrian] president Bashar Asad who was married to [REDACTED]. So frequent were the meetings between Asif and [REDACTED] that Asif jokingly referred to [REDACTED] as AQI's ambassador to [Syria]. AQI preferred to work with [Syrian] military intelligence rather than the [Syrian] Mukhabarat, which has been led by Major General Ali al-Mamluk since mid-2005. Asif Shawkat, General Muhsin al-Aqasi, and Brigadier General Burhan Burhan all met with representatives of AQI, FRE, and SAR insurgent groups in interactions that were overseen or at least acknowledged by President Asad (115).

This seemingly puzzling relationship carried clear benefits for both parties involved. Despite the regime’s longstanding hatred of domestic jihadist movements–dating to the Syrian Fighting Vanguard of the 1970s—it instrumentally used them to launder actions planned and orchestrated by its intelligence services. The assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is a good example. In 2005, the UN investigation assessed that Syrian military intelligence director Asif Shawkat forced the alleged culprit Ahmad Abu Adas to claim responsibility in the name of “al-Nasra wal Jihad fi Bilad al-Shams.”^[22] The investigation determined that no such group had ever existed and that it was merely a disguise for Syrian intelligence’s own assassination of Hariri. Similarly, Syrian intelligence used the jihadist group Jund al-Sham as “cover for infiltrating intelligence agents in western Anbar” (115). However, Jund al-Sham was more authentic than “al-Nasra wal Jihad,” as it engaged in small attacks against the Syrian state in 2004-06.^[23]

For AQI’s part, it received logistical and operational support to attack Coalition forces from a clearly short-sighted enemy. Almost a decade later, Islamic State (AQI’s successor) repaid the favor by conquering large swathes of Syria and very nearly killing Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, one veteran of AQI/ISI, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, first left Damascus on a bus to Baghdad and returned over twenty years later as a conqueror, ousting the very man who once facilitated his jihadist adventures. However, in 2005-06, the regime was unconcerned with any notion that the jihadists it aided could one day strike back:

[Syria] also stepped up its intelligence collection efforts over the summer of 2006 in order to gather as much information as possible should it choose to facilitate suicide attacks between the summer of 2006 and the end of Ramadan. [Syrian] collection efforts were focused in particular against Coalition bases, which the [Syrian] government believed would be turned over to the Iraqi army once the Coalition withdrew. In March 2006, Iraqi soldier [REDACTED] was kidnapped by [REDACTED] while traveling to purchase a car. He was released in early June 2006 after his family paid a $4,000 ransom after four months of being tortured and interrogated by [Syrian] intelligence during which they called him a traitor to the Arab world. As a result of his experience, many Iraqi soldiers and police now feared that they too would be kidnapped and tortured by [Syrian] intelligence. (116)

By late summer, the Syrian state was a significant player in insurgent activity in Anbar. Alongside AQI, it supported a wide array of insurgent groups.

At the same time, during the summer of 2006, Israel went to war against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Interestingly, Syria did not divert much attention from Anbar to support Hizbullah, as neither the Syrian state nor Israel intended to attack one another. Hizbullah’s excellent performance during the war earned it enormous prestige across the Muslim world and across sects—Salafi mosques prayed for their victory. Indeed, even Al Qaida Central was impressed by Hizbullah’s achievements and viewed them as potential allies against the “Zionist-Crusader Alliance.” Naturally, Ayman al-Zawahiri was most vocal in expressing these sentiments, though other AQ leaders were much more skeptical and continued to view Hizbullah as heretics, at best, and apostates, at worst. Among AQ supporters, many were surprisingly supportive of Hizbullah, though they still regarded them as deviants.^[24] This cautious support came to an end with the Syrian Civil War, during which Hizbullah and AQ fiercely fought one another. To this day, Sunni jihadists and identitarians contemptuously call it “Hizbullat” (Party of al-Lat, a pagan Arabian god) or “Hizbushaytan” (Party of Satan).

Anti-AQI Forces Begin to Unite

Despite AQI’s enormous strength, many Sunni tribes of Anbar were growing intolerant of its arrogant usurpation of power and began to fight back. The story of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe is illustrative. A number of AQI leaders had been based in the Albu Ali Jassim’s area north of Ramadi. They demanded that the tribe turn over all of their weapons to AQI, which unsurprisingly led to conflict:

The demand by AQI was occasioned by a feud between the Albu Ali Jassim and AQI, a feud that began with a dispute between the Iraqi AQI fighters in the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area and foreign fighters in the Albu ‘Ubayd tribal area. In early 2006, a [REDACTED] AQI leader who was a rival of [REDACTED] had one of his Yemeni lieutenants kidnap an Iraqi police officer and kill him without receiving orders from [REDACTED]. Enraged, [REDACTED] planned to kill the AQI leader, but the [REDACTED] learned of his plans, declared the entire Albu Ali Jassim tribe infidels and ordered his fighters to kill them.

The result of the declaration was that, by late August, the Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Nimr, Albu Alay, and Albu Assaf tribes were providing a large number of enthusiastic police applicants to the Iraqi government. In fact a majority of the 177 applicants for the Ramadi police who reported after a recruiting drive on August 17 came from these tribal lands in the Jazira area (119).

As expected, AQI responded with overwhelming force, killing the Albu Ali Jassim’s leader and several of his family members, worsening the war between the AQI-aligned Albu Ubayd and the Ali Jassim. Throughout the summer of 2006, this brutal pattern of behavior had created enemies out of a dozen tribes in the Ramadi area. Several of these tribes openly requested Coalition support, following the Albu Mahal’s model, and began to make sustained attacks on AQI, killing several commanders. Slowly but surely, tribes were growing bolder against AQI.

Interestingly, tribal resistance to AQI often took the form of tribal civil wars. Consider the case of the Fuhaylat and the Owesat, both subtribes of the Albu Issa. The Fuhaylat supported AQI, while the Owesat supported the Coalition, leading Fuhaylat members to kill Owesat tribesmen. In response, the Owesat leadership confronted Fuhaylat shaykhs. This was remarkably brave as AQI was extremely strong in the area, possessing up to three hunred veteran fighters who could be—and were in fact—deployed as necessary. Local villagers accordingly took up arms to support police forces against AQI. The Owesat leadership organized these tribesmen into a 200-strong militia to fight off AQI, but their forces ended up being defeated by the AQI-backed Fuhaylat. The Owesat’s surrender assured Fuhaylat and AQI dominance in the area. Similarly, warfare broke out between the Albu Fahd and the Albu Ubayd over the latter’s abduction of a prominent Albu Fahd member. This incident capped off a long list of Albu Fahd grievances against AQI, including assassinations of tribal figures, wanton violence against civilians, and general disrespect for tribal norms. AQI’s brutality was finally catching up with it:

At the end of August, anti-AQI tribes began to reach out beyond their own members to form a more general anti-AQI organization. Representatives of the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Julib, and Albu Risha tribes met on August 31 as part of a precursor for a larger tribal conference that would discuss security and stability in Ramadi (121).

This organization was soon called the Anbar Revolutionaries, which despite its small size, represented an increasingly serious tribal challenge to AQI. One of the leaders of the Anbar Revolutionaries worked to form an agreement between Iraqi security forces, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Harakat Islamiyah, an anti-AQI group. The plan was for these latter groups to eventually join the Iraqi police in Ramadi to strengthen its ranks and popular image. In marked contrast to previous anti-AQI efforts, these fighters were able to assassinate several key AQI commanders in Ramadi, reflecting greater penetration of the latter’s command structure. Meanwhile, AQI continued its efforts to create a jihadist emirate.

Such forms of social control are essential in insurgencies, as they not only negate the official administration, they also legitimize the insurgency as a potential government force, not merely as a guerrilla group. AQI’s ability to assert its authority in “normal” settings reflected its own power and popular intimidation: “Thus, when AQI took over the Women and Children's Hospital in Ramadi, hospital staff was separated by gender by AQI fighters who claimed that allowing men and women to work together would lead to carnal activities. Patients were beaten for drinking and Shi'a were denied treatment” (123). Likewise, AQI formed a sharia court in Karmah with the power of life and death over its residents. Fighters’ perception of this shadow government is fascinating:

By the end of August, Shajariyah (a village east of Ramadi and one of AQI's primary headquarters in the area) was referred to by members of the group as "the center of the Islamic Caliphate in Anbar." All the effort expended by AQI to create a state in Iraq were about to come to fruition, and the group was merely awaiting orders from AQSL to permit the official declaration of an Islamic state of Iraq…

In other words, the Islamic State caliphate was there in August 2006. The “caliphate” label was a significant escalation. Although there was likely no difference on the ground, the ideological project had considerably radicalized. Where before, AQI fighters spoke of “Islamic Emirates” in Fallujah, Al Qaim, etc., they now spoke of the “Islamic Caliphate,” the global implications of which must have been impossible to miss. The formal declaration of the Islamic State—and eventually the caliphate—was coming. Such a move would not only stir enormous controversy within the jihadist movement, it would risk splitting it entirely. AQ Central almost certainly noticed the dangers of this move, so it is extremely unlikely that they authorized the “State” declaration despite the Study author’s claims.^[25]

This declaration was made entirely in Iraq, presenting the world with a fait accompli. By this point, if not earlier, we can safely say that meaningful ties between AQI and AQ Central had been severed, setting the stage for the later 2014 split. It is worth noting that one top AQ leader, Adam Gadahn, later complained that relations had ended back in 2006. The global jihadist movement was seeing something radically and dangerously new in Iraq.

This radicalization fit the intensifying polarization in Iraqi Sunni society. In the words of the Study:

The insurgency at the end of the summer of 2006 was thus trending in two quite different directions. On the one hand, AQI could not have seemed stronger: intimidating and murdering almost at will, it imposed its vision of shari’ah on any areas over which it had influence in preparation for the declaration of its Emirate. Ramadi had fallen even further into AQI’s hands, Hit and Haditha seemed hopeless, and other areas of Anbar, including Zaidon and most small villages throughout the province, were apparently firmly under their thumb.

Yet, on the other hand, there was one sign that something quite different was happening underneath the surface. There were clear indications that tribal resistance to AQI was not simply fading away and that certain sheikhs were not giving in to AQI’s murder and intimidation. What had started as the actions of one tribe—the Albu Mahal—had grown to include more than a dozen tribes and subtribes, all fighting AQI for reasons of their own initiatives and the new Anbar Revolutionaries promised a chance to organize this resistance if only the right mix of leadership and vision could be found (126).

The Sahwa movement that would nearly end the insurgency was finally coming into view, as was the drive to form the Islamic State of Iraq, which we will analyze in a forthcoming piece.

Conclusion

Although we are not at the end of our study, we have encountered a number of themes that are worth briefly making explicit. First, we must ask: why exactly did AQI (in its various iterations) come to lead, then largely absorb, the Iraqi insurgency? Initially, it had a number of major disadvantages compared to other Iraqi insurgent groups, including jihadist groups. It was dominated by foreigners, had few financial and material resources, was viewed as fringe extremists by most fellow insurgents, etc. It is puzzling that an initially foreigner-dominated organization would not only achieve hegemony over a national liberation struggle but would even spawn a global archipelagic jihadist movement (IS) from this struggle. The answer lies in AQI’s particular ideology and version of strategic accelerationism, which can be called “Zarqawism.”

The essence of strategic accelerationism is a willingness to set everything on fire and to throw the world off the edge, deep into the unknown. Such a strategy runs the risk of going beyond one’s control, yet it has the distinct advantage of taking away control from one’s enemies. The realm of the unknown afflicts both parties, creating a significant opportunity for an adept actor to direct the chaos and determine the scale and tempo of its expansion. It is worth noting that “Zarqawism”—with its genocidal sectarianism and generally nihilistic bloodlust—need not be the only form of strategic accelerationism, but it is the most shocking and pernicious form of it.^[26]

Zarqawi’s mere choice of Iraq as a prospective jihadist theater is telling of this strategy. Prior to 2003, Iraq was not considered by Al Qaida as a serious front for the jihadist project. This was Zarqawi’s and several other non-AQ jihadist’ (especially within Iraq itself) distinct insight and innovation.^[27] They saw opportunities that Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri did not—namely, Iraq’s central location in the Middle East, its sectarian composition, and its imminent confrontation with the US.

Most crucially, they saw the same opportunities that the pre-war Iraqi jihadists had seen, making it especially easy for both to merge into what became Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). This integrated the foreign jihadists into the Iraqi insurgency. Similarly, JTJ’s attacks in 2003 are illustrative. These were mass-casualty strikes that slaughtered scores, if not hundreds, of civilians, alongside Coalition and Shiite Islamist targets. On the one hand, these recognized from early on the alliance between Coalition forces and major Shiite Islamist organizations like SCIRI and Dawa.^[28] In other words, JTJ saw that sectarianism was already a component of the war. The question therefore was how big of a component would it become. On the other hand, these attacks accelerated this component and magnified its role. Sectarian polarization would therefore take place on JTJ’s terms, not the Coalition’s or SCIRI’s. As a result, JTJ/AQI was able to tilt the struggle against US imperialism and for Iraqi national liberation to its own extremely malevolent vision, with devastating consequences for the region.

Indeed, AQI’s fanatical rejection of imperialism in every respect made it stand out in comparison to other groups, which held halfway positions in attempts to balance the national liberation struggle and their own efforts to secure favorable positions in the new order. Among ordinary (Sunni) Iraqis, the new order had no legitimacy, being as it was the artificial creature of the hated invader. Any possible enticements had little or no appeal. What could an average tribal fighter gain from the Coalition-installed government that he could not get from a free Iraq? The only organization stridently committed to this goal was AQI. Its rhetoric was backed up by impressive battlefield credentials, killing and wounding far more Coalition and Iraqi quisling forces than every other group.

However, AQI’s aims were not simply Iraqi national liberation. It sought to form a Salafi Jihadist emirate, in which Shiites and non-Muslims would be exterminated. This was not an idle threat, as shown by the countless bombings on Shiite civilians, collectively killing thousands. The organization’s acceleration of the sectarian war polarized most Sunni Iraqis into tolerating, if not adopting, these views. Furthermore, the Shiite Islamists’ alliance with the Coalition and their vicious targeting of Sunnis served as concrete evidence of AQI’s propaganda. In contrast to AQI, other insurgent groups implicitly, and often explicitly, recognized the legitimacy of the post-2003 order. Their attempts to negotiate and politically engage with it indicated some recognition of its authority in Iraq. To the average fighter, this was anathema, making AQI all the more attractive. As a result, AQI was able to subordinate or outright absorb so many of its rivals. The lesson therefore is the necessity of uncompromising anti-imperialism. Had other more moderate groups pursued a similarly strident path, it is possible that AQI would have been marginalized as an extremist fringe organization, perhaps entirely preventing Islamic State from ever existing.

Appendix: Photo Gallery

1. I will use AQI and MSC interchangeably as the two organizations had significant overlap.

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2. This same general analysis explains why Hamas became the vehicle for Palestinian resistance, while the PLO became irrelevant, except as subcontractors of the Zionist regime. Cf. Assaf Kfoury, “Hamas: From Candidate Enforcer to Implacable Foe,” Cosmonaut Magazine, March 1, 2024, cosmonautmag.com/2024/03/hamas-from-candidate-enforcer-to-implacable-foe/.

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3. The full letter can be found here: www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm.

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4. We know that MSC still filmed beheadings because the Coalition captured unreleased beheading videos during several raids: x.com/Mr0rangetracker/status/176461402607861760?t=Ncp9P8cTAKjE-51PrVaxdg&s=19.

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5. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Biography of Abu Ali al-Anbari: Full Translation and Analysis,” aymennjawad.org, November 17, 2024, www.aymennjawad.org/21877/the-biography-of-abu-ali-al-anbari-full; See also: x.com/Mr0rangetracker/status/1188434325315960833?t=Ncp9P8cTAKjE-51PrVaxdg&s=19.

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6. Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside and Charlie Winter, eds., ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Oxford University Press, 2020), 134-141.

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7. It is worth noting that the destructive capacity of IS has never once approximated that of the IDF or the US military. The moral difference between a car bomb and a 2,000-lb bunker buster is unclear.

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8. Kazimi, “‘What Was That All About?’ Flawed Methodologies in Explaining the Origins of ISIS (2003–2013),” Bustan: The Middle East Book Review 8, no. 2 (2017), www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/bustan.8.2.0151.

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9. All twelve have been identified over the years, but their names have not been listed together in one place, so I must find them separately. So far, I have found the following founders of IS (some of which are obvious): Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Jordanian), Abu Anas al-Shami (Palestinian Kuwaiti), Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani (Lebanese), Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (Egyptian), Umar Hadid (Iraqi), Abu Azzam al-Iraqi (Iraqi), Tariq al-Wahsh (Iraqi), Abu Zahra al-Issawi (Iraqi), Abu al-Harith al-Issawi (Iraqi). Note the large presence of Iraqis in the top leadership from the very beginning.

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10. Rawi had no jihadist or even dissident experience before the fall of Saddam. By his own admission, he was an ordinary employee at the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.

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11. See: robashlar.substack.com/p/islamic-state-biography-manaf-al.

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12. On March 12, 2006, a squad of US marines abducted and gang-raped a 14-year old girl named Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi. They then murdered her and her family, with the only survivors being her brothers who had been away at the time of the attack. This especially disturbing incident reflected a broader pattern of systematic sexual violence by US troops against Iraqis, particularly teenaged girls. Muhajir’s revenge killing of US soldiers from the same unit accordingly boosted AQI’s flagging public image among Sunnis.

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13. Peter Devlin, I-MEF G-2, “State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar,” August 17, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/thegamble/documents/Devlin_Anbar.pdf.

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14. Devlin puts AQI’s ‘Iraqification’ at too late of a date. I believe that by early 2004, if not late 2003, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was an Iraqi organization in the rank-and-file. During the 2002-04 period, Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani and Abu Anas al-Shami successfully recruited many Iraqi fighters and integrated several Iraqi militant groups. Of the twelve JTJ founders, five were Iraqis and at least two top lieutenants were Iraqis, all of whom bringing their own native networks into JTJ. Similarly, in the first half of 2004, future IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani was in charge of a body that linked JTJ with an Iraqi Salafi Jihadist militia composed of 3,000 fighters.

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15. They were individually in charge of: kidnapping, attacking the Coalition, attacking the Iraqi government, weapons smuggling, financing, assassinations, and execution.

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16. The settlements were Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Karmah, Habbaniyah, and Yusufiyah.

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17. Cf. Bourzou Daraghi, Erika Solomon, “Fuelling Isis Inc,” Financial Times, September 21, 2014; Erika Solomon, Guy Chazan, Sam Jones, “Isis Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorists,” Financial Times, October 14, 2015; Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong, Steven Bernard, “Inside Isis Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil,” Financial Times, February 29, 2016.

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18. Cf. Erika Solomon, Sam Jones, “Isis Inc: Loot and taxes keep jihadi economy churning,” Financial Times, December 14, 2015; Idem, “Isis Inc: Jihadis fund war machine but squeeze ‘citizens’,” Financial Times, December 15, 2015.

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19. See: Ibrahim Hamidi, “Exclusive: How Syria and Iran plotted over a post-Saddam Iraq,” Al Majalla, 18 March, 2024; idem, “Khaddam Files: Khamenei-Assad plot to turn post-Saddam Iraq into America's ‘new Vietnam,’” Al Majalla, March 29, 2024.

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20. There is even evidence that a Syrian spy was present at the Rawah Camp. See: https://robashlar.substack.com/p/lions-of-the-ansar-in-the-land-of; https://robashlar.substack.com/p/lions-of-the-ansar-in-the-land-of-46b

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21. All bracketed insertions in the following block quotes were originally redacted.

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22. See: “Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council”; “Letter dated 20 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

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23. Cf. “Syria: clash with ‘Jund al-Sham’ in Raqqa” (in Arabic), al-Qabas, May 26, 2006, https://www.alqabas.com/article/208487-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9/.

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24. This could be observed on now-defunct jihadist forums like Al Fallujah Military Forum or even “Zarqawist” forums like Hanein, which openly identified with ISI.

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25. From the Abbottabad Letters, we know that Usama bin Ladin and other AQ Central figures learned of ISI’s existence at the same time that the rest of the world did. They had not been consulted on the “State” declaration. As a show of unity and even sincerity, AQ Central expressed support for the project but in private several figures were concerned. Atiyatullah al-Libi was immediately alarmed by the move and strongly criticized it. Cf. Nelly Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers (Yale University Press, 2023), 161-63.

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26. I would consider Yahya Sinwar’s vision of October 7 and its consequences to have been distinctly in line with strategic accelerationism. It is worth noting that the Axis partner that most embraced strategic accelerationism, Ansarallah, has been the most successful. In contrast, those Axis partners that shied from it–the Assad regime, Hizbullah, Iran, and PMF–have suffered most dearly. October 7 created a new world. The ensuing crisis has been over who will seize this new world. Sinwar set off a similar process as Zarqawi did in Iraq. This is explored at further length by this piece: https://robashlar.substack.com/p/guest-post-strategic-accelerationism.

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27. It is a myth that Zarqawi’s network was the only foreign jihadist network operating in Iraq. There were several networks that all coalesced under Zarqawi’s leadership in 2003. Zarqawi and eleven other jihadists, including five Iraqis, founded Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad at the Rawah Camp in 2003, though the group’s existence would not be publicly announced until April 2004.

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28. For example, the primary target of the Imam Ali Shrine attack in Najaf was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI and the Badr Brigades, which were both close partners to the Coalition. Interestingly, this attack was not orchestrated by Zarqawi’s circle but by a local Iraqi Salafi Jihadist network (led by Abu Azzam al-Iraqi) that very soon joined forces with Zarqawi due to ideological and strategic alignment.

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